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THE LEGALITY OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF PEYOTE
BY THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH: A
COMMENTARY ON THE FREE EXERCISE, EQUAL
PROTECTION, AND ESTABLISHMENT ISSUES
RAISED BY THE PEYOTE WAY CHURCH OF GOD
CASE
John Thomas Bannon, Jr.*
Introduction
In December 1980 the Peyote Way Church of God (Peyote Way) filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas;
Peyote Way named as a defendant, in his official capacity, the Attorney General
of the United States.' Peyote Way, represented by the Dallas, Texas Chapter
of the American Civil Liberties Union, claimed, among other things, that it had
a free exercise right to use the controlled substance peyote in its religious
rituals, that the federal exemption2 allowing the religious use of peyote by the
Native American Church, and denying the exemption to Peyote Way, violated
the equal protection principle, and that, in addition, the exemption constituted
an establishment of religion? After ten years of litigation the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Peyote Way's Free Exercise,
Equal Protection, and Establishment Clause claims, and upheld the federal
exemption.4
In essence Peyote Way's lawsuit was directed at the Native American
Church, with its approximately 250,000 tribal members, most of whom live on
reservations in the western United States! Peyote Way, with its five resident
members and approximately 150 nonresident members, was incorporated in
Arizona in 1979, and had as its place of worship a ranch in southern Arizona.6
*Senior Counsel, United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division. LL.M., 1997,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; J.D., 1976, University of Notre Dame Law School;
Ph.D., 1973, Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.
1. The writer handled the Peyote Way Church of God litigation for the United States
Department of Justice from the lawsuit's inception in 1980 until its conclusion in 1991. The
views expressed in this article are the writer's own, and do not represent the views of the
Department of Justice.
2. The federal exemption provides in pertinent part: "The listing of peyote as a controlled
substance in Schedule I does not apply to the use of peyote in the bona fide ceremonies of the
Native American Church .. " 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990).
3. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213-17 (5th Cir. 1991).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1212.
6. Id. at 1213.
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None of Peyote Way's members were tribal Indians, although one of them
claimed to have Indian blood, and none of them were members of the Native
American Church For the reasons set forth below, neither Peyote Way nor the
Native American Church have a free exercise right to use the controlled
substance peyote, and a decision holding the federal exemption unconstitutional
would have been yet another blow to Native American culture and religion.
Why? Because it is unlikely that Congress would expand the exemption to
include non-Indians, or other controlled substances, given the considerable
potential for abuse such an expansion would provide. For the reasons set forth
below, the United States Court of Appeals was right to reject Peyote Way's
Equal Protection and Establishment Clause challenges to the federal exemption.
An historical sketch of this centuries-old aboriginal religion should provide some
insight as to why the federal exemption is so important to Native American
peyotists.
Aboriginal Peyotism: An Historical Sketch
Peyotism is centuries old; peyote has been used by Native Americans in their
religious rituals for at least four hundred years, culminating in the present day
Native American Church.! Peyotism has its origins in pre-Conquest Mexico;
Inquisition documents in sixteenth century Mexico describe the religious use of
peyote by Mexican Indians? From Mexico peyotism spread into what is now
Texas and Oklahoma; Oklahoma tribes practicing peyotism in the 1890s had
lived in the Rio Grande Valley a century or more previously."0 Tribal Indians
were using peyote in their religious ceremonies, in territory that would become
part of the United States, at approximately the same time the Founding Fathers
were in Philadelphia drafting the Constitution of the United States.
"Peyote is a small spineless cactus having psychedelic properties; it grows
naturally in a limited area, principally in northern Mexico and southern
Texas."'" Peyote is a common ritual hallucinogen that is used in peyotist
ceremonies to induce visions; this natural growing plant substance has the
capacity to alter consciousness. 2 Peyotism is a noncreedal faith; its members
accept a monotheistic deity, and use peyote as a mediator between the human
and the divine. 3 Personal psychic experiences of the supernatural, induced by
7. d. at 1212.
8. OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 3 (1987).
9. Id. at 18.
10. Id. at 45.
11. Id. at3.
12. HARPER-COLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 405-06 (Jonathan Z. Smith ed., 1995)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY OF RELIGION].
13. it. at 757.
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this hallucinogenic cactus, shape the peyotist faith, its ethical nortns, and its
moral values. 4
The principal ceremony of peyotism is an all-night ritual that consists of
praying, singing, preaching, and testimonials, along with the ingestion of
peyote." It is the ingestion of peyote that is the central ritual of peyotism, the
ingestion producing a warm and pleasant euphoria. 6 While the peyote religion
is saturated with Christian values, representing the acceptance of new social
values, "the rituals that remain the core of the cult are entirely native."'7 The
peyote ceremony as it developed in the mountains of north central Mexico is
"remarkably similar" to the ceremony as it developed in the United States. 8
Oklahoma was the cradle of peyotism in the United States; one reason for
this was the federal government's establishment of reservations in the Indian
Territory of Oklahoma. 9 Different Indian peoples, different Indian cultures,
and different Indian religions were thrown together on these reservations.' By
1874 the remnants of the Plains Indian tribes were sent to these reservations,
along with the "Five Civilized Tribes" that earlier had been removed from the
homelands east of the Mississippi River.2' With the coming together of so
many diverse tribes, there arose the potential for a variety of pan-tribal or
intertribal movements. By the 1880s, with the Indians conquered and in
disarray, peyotism flourished on the reservations.' Many of these tribal Indians
found comfort in peyotism, and this traditional Indian religion was instrumental
in bringing stability to life on the reservations.' By 1910 peyotism was
flourishing among the tribal Indians of Oklahoma, and from there it spread to
numerous other tribes in Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota,
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico.'
Indian defeat and disarray were important factors in the rise of peyotism.
New religions tend to rise in times of crisis, and the crisis associated with the
rise of peyotism, and other pan-Indian religions, was the encroachment of
European culture.' New religions originate in situations perceived by their
followers as a crisis in the life of the group, a crisis precipitated by contacts
between two cultures. As the tribes were forced from their homelands and
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. STEWART, supra note 8, at 36.
17. DICTIONARY OF RELIGION, supra note 12, at 757.
18. STEWART, supra note 8, at 25-26.
19. Id. at 53.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 57.
22. Id. at 61-65.
23. Id. at 68.
24. Id. at 148.
25. DICTIONARY OF RELIGION, supra note 12, at 761.
26. Id. at 762.
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confined to reservations they contemplated the destruction of their traditional
way of life.Y
Unlike other pan-Indian religions, peyotism was adaptive, putting old
traditions to new uses; by the end of the nineteenth century peyotism had fused
traditional aboriginal elements with Christian elements, and it was this fused
peyotism that spread so rapidly among the numerous tribes of North America.'
Peyotism endured by redefining the crisis of white encroachment, emphasizing
the maintenance of indigenous values and identity over time.29 Of all the pan-
Indian religious movements, peyotism was the most popular and durable of
all," the most important pan-Indian institution in America."
One should not forget the correlation between peyotism and the triumph of
white civilization over the tribes. 2 This religion of accommodation was a
response to a shattered status, the response of a defeated people overwhelmed
by waves of white settlers?3 Peyotism, a religion of the oppressed, helped
Indians cope with their subordinate status.' This aboriginal American religion
was the last of the great pan-tribal religious movements? Many Native
Americans believe that peyotism represents the last strong link to an aboriginal
past. ' Indeed, in 1918, when tribal leaders decided to incorporate and to
choose a name, they chose the name "Native American Church" to emphasize
not only intertribal solidarity, but also aboriginality 7 With this background in'
mind, a discussion of Peyote Way's constitutional claims is now appropriate.
Even Before the Supreme Court's Decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
There Was No Free Exercise Right To Use a Controlled Substance in
Violation of Federal Criminal Law
In its lawsuit Peyote Way claimed it had a free exercise right to use peyote
in its religious ceremonies, and that 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 844" which
prohibits the possession and distribution of peyote, were unconstitutional as
applied to Peyote Way's members. The question is whether the court of appeals
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Id. at 763.
30. DAVID F. ABERLE, THE PEYOTE RELIGION AMONG THE NAVAJO 3 (2d ed. 1982).
31. STEWART, supra note 8, at 327.
32. WESTON LA BARRE, THE PEYOTE CULT 113 (5th ed. 1989).
33. ABERLE, supra note 30, at 15.
34. Id. at 352-53.
35. LA BARRE, supra note 32, at 121, 166.
36. Id. at 166.
37. Id. at 169.
38. Section 841 makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture,
distribute, or disburse a controlled substance; section 844 makes it unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance. Peyote is a controlled substance. See
21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule 1, (c)(12) (1990).
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in Peyote Way Church of God properly rejected Peyote Way's free exercise
claim.39 A reading of the Supreme Court's free exercise opinions clearly
suggests that the court of appeals properly rejected Peyote Way's free exercise
claim.
In Employment Division v. Smithe8 the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Free Exercise Clause permitted Oregon to include the religious use
of peyote within the scope of its general criminal prohibition of controlled
substance use, thereby permitting Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to
persons fired from their jobs because of their religious use of peyote.4' In
answering this question in the affirmative, the Court rejected respondents' claim
that their religious motivation placed them beyond the reach of a criminal statute
not specifically directed at their religious practice, a statute respondents
conceded was constitutional as applied to those who used peyote for
nonreligious purposes.42 The Court was adamant in its refusal to hold "that
when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions,
not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from government
regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now."'3
The respondents also contended that even if the State of Oregon refused to
automatically extend an exemption to religiously motivated conduct from
generally applicable criminal laws, the Court would have to evaluate the claim
under the balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner;," under this test the government
must justify any actions that substantially burden a religious practice by a
compelling governmental interest. 5 In rejecting this contention, the Court
stated that it had "never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the
Sherbert test except the denial of employment compensation. Although we have
sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we
have always found the test satisfied ....,6 Moreover, said the Court, "[e]ven
if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the employment
compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a
generally applicable criminal law."'7 In other words, Sherbert's compelling
governmental interest requirement had no applicability whatever to a criminal
statute of general applicability. In light of Smith, it is abundantly clear that the
Court could not sustain Peyote Way's free exercise claim, and the court of
appeals properly rejected Peyote Way's claim on the authority of Smith. Even
39. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991).
40. 414 U.S. 872 (1990).
41. Id. at 874.
42. Id. at 878.
43. Id. at 882.
44. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
45. Id. at 406-07.
46. Smith, 414 U.S. at 883.
47. Id. at 884.
48. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991).
No. 2]
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if the Smith majority had not abandoned the Sherbert test, however, it is difficult
to see how Peyote Way's free exercise claim could have been sustained.
A number of commentators have been highly critical of Smith as
insufficiently protective of religious liberty, arguing, in essence, that the new test
makes accommodation of free exercise interests too dependent on the political
process.49 This widespread criticism is overstated. As one commentator has
noted, the claim that Smith threatens religious liberty in some novel way justifies
considerable skepticism given that the "generous promises of sensitivity to
eccentric religious practices [in the pre-Smith rhetoric of free exercise discourse]
were routinely betrayed.""
While the pre-Smith test appeared highly protective of religious liberty, it
clearly was not, for the Court generally has had only "the weakest commitment"
to freedom of religious exercise." Since entering the field, the Court has done
little to protect religious freedom against what some have seen as the most
powerful governmental threat of all, that posed by the national government. 2
While the Court has been portrayed as the champion of religious liberty, such
portrayal is less than accurate 3 This supposed champion of religious freedom
has never once found that a congressional statute infringed on the Free Exercise
Clause 4 In short, the record of the pre-Smith regime was "rather dismal."55
Just how dismal? Well, in the seventeen free exercise cases decided by the
Supreme Court from 1963 to 1990, the free exercise claim prevailed in only
four instances; moreover, three of the cases were employment compensation
cases indistinguishable from Sherbert, the doctrinal source of pre-Smith free
exercise law. A brief examination of this body of law should prove
instructive.
Since the Nation's founding, the Supreme Court has alternated between no-
exemption and exemption standards for religiously motivated conduct. 7 In
Reynolds v. United States58 the Supreme Court rejected a free exercise claim
involving a federal criminal statute prohibiting polygamy. After concluding that
49. See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 55 (1995); Michael McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
50. Ma k Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REv. 117-18.
51. FREDERICK M. GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1995).
52. STE-VEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 125 (1995).
53. Id.
54. Il
55. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 122.
56. Id. at 121.
57. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., The Robe and the Cloth: The Supreme Court and Religion in
the United States, 7 J.L. & POL. 481, 487-88 (1991).
58. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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the statute was within the legislative power of Congress, the Court went on to
state:
[The remaining question] is, whether those who make polygamy a
part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute.
If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their
religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who
do, must be acquitted and go free. This would introduce a new
element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices....
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the
exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural
marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to
the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
laws of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances.59
Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds explicitly endorsed the Jeffersonian
theory that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment erected a wall of
separation between church and state, restricting free exercise to religious
belief. Jefferson opposed religious exemptions because they conferred special
privileges on believers.6' According to Jefferson, "the opinions of men are not
the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction ... and it is time
enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere
when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order."' This
belief-action distinction, characterized as a "secular regulation rule," applied
generally from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.63
In Sherbert v. Verner,' the Supreme Court abandoned the belief-action
distinction of Reynolds. Sherbert involved a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church who was fired because she would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of her faith; unable to find work because she would not work on
59. Id. at 166-67.
60. Id. at 163-64.
61. Howard, supra note 57, at 486.
62. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779), reprinted
in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS at 347 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1984).
63. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 59 (1990).
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
No. 2]
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Saturday, she filed for unemployment compensation.' The state denied her
application because she would not accept suitable work when offered.'
The Court held that the denial of Sherbert's application imposed a burden on
her free exercise of religion.' The Court made a cryptic reference to the
distinction between welfare and criminal legislation, noting that no criminal
sanctions directly compelled Sherbert to work. Despite only an indirect burden
on her right of free exercise, the indirect burden was unconstitutional., Her
ineligibility for benefits, said the Court, derived "solely from the practice of her
religion.' c9 The Court went on to consider whether some "compelling state
interest" justified the "substantial infringement" of Sherbert's free exercise right,
and concluded that "[n]o such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present
case." 
0
Sherbert suggested that the government could burden the free exercise of
religion only if it could show a "compelling" regulatory interest that it could not
protect in any less intrusive manner; this less restrictive alternative requirement
seemed to impose upon the government the heavy burden of showing that the
granting of the exemption would "substantially undermine" the government's
compellirng interestY This strict scrutiny test seemed to be heavily weighted
toward personal freedom and the accommodation of minority religious
practie" Sherbert implied that religious liberty was a value high in the
hierarchy of constitutional values, and that accommodation was only a "marginal
drag" on the government's regulatory authority, a "marginal drag" that would not
justify the burdening of free exercise.' Sherbert, presumably, was a
repudiation of the belief-action distinction holding out the promise that religious
liberty would prevail over bureaucratic values.74
With the Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' the promise of Sherbert
seemed fulfilled. In Yoder the Supreme Court sustained the claim of members
of the Old Order Amish that application of the state's compulsory school-
attendance law, as to them, violated their right to freely exercise their religion.76
Acknowledging the state's responsibility for the education of its citizens, and its
power to impose reasonable regulations in the field of education, the Court
nonetheless noted that the state's responsibility "is not totally free from a
65. Id. at 399-400.
66. Id at 401.
67. Id. at 403.
68. Id. at 403-04.
69. Id. at 404.
70. Id. at 406-07.
71. GEDICKS, supra note 51, at 102-03.
72. Howard, supra note 57, at 488-89.
73. GEDIcKS, supra note 51, at 103.
74. Id.
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
76. Id. at 218.
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balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests" such
as the right to free exercise.' "[Only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion."'78 The Court noted the impact of the state's compulsory-attendance
law on the Old Order Amish and the practice of their religion, finding that the
impact was "not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law
affirmatively compel[led] them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform
acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs."79
The Court went on to reject the notion that religiously grounded conduct was
outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, for in the context of free
exercise jurisprudence "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments."8 Finally, in dealing with the state's claim that "its interest in
its system of compulsory education [wa]s so compelling that even the
established practices of the Amish must give way," the Court expressed
skepticism:
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake... we
cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity
in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests
that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory
education to age [sixteen] and the impediment to those objectives
that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."
Needless to say, the state failed to satisfy the Court's searching examination of
its interests; the state's generalized "compelling" interest was not sufficient.
In Sherbert and Yoder the Court's actions matched its rhetoric. The era of the
constitutionally compelled exemption seemed imminent. To Sherbert's
requirement that the government justify, by a compelling interest, any law that
burdens the free exercise of religion, Yoder added the requirement that the
government justify by a compelling interest any refusal to grant an exemption
to a religious objector.' Under the doctrine of the constitutionally compelled
exemption set forth in Sherbert and Yoder, the Free Exercise Clause mandated
the relief of believers from the obligation of obeying any law requiring them to
perform any act prohibited by their religious beliefs, or from the obligation of
obeying any law prohibiting them from performing an act required by their
religious beliefs, unless it would frustrate an overriding or compelling
governmental interest by relieving religious believers of their obligation to obey
77. Id. at 214.
78. Id. at 215.
79. Id. at 218.
80. Id. at 220.
81. Id. at 221.
82. GEDICKS, supra note 51, at 104.
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the law.' Undoubtedly, Sherbert and Yoder promised "extraordinary
protection" for the free exercise of religion.'M In the years that followed,
however, Sherbert and Yoder would not fulfill their promise; there would be no
extraordinary protection for the free exercise of religion. Since Yoder the Court
has granted no free exercise exemptions outside the field of employment
compensation." The Court never extended the constitutionally compelled
exemption beyond the facts of Sherbert and Yoder.'
United States v. Lee" marked the beginning of the end of the
constitutionally compelled exemption. Lee involved the Old Order Amish, who
believed there was a religiously based obligation to provide for its members the
type of assistance provided by the social security system; Lee, a member of the
Old Order Amish, claimed that both the payment and the receipt of social
security benefits was forbidden by the Amish faith, a claim the Court
accepted!'
In this conflict between the Amish faith and the obligations imposed by the
social security system, the Court held that accommodating the Amish faith
would unduly interfere with the government's compelling interest in
administering a comprehensive social security system." The broad public
interest in maintaining a sound tax system was of such a high order, said the
Court that religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes afforded no
basis for resisting the tax.'
While purporting to apply a strict scrutiny test in Lee, the Court used
something less than strict scrutiny in Goldman v. Weinberger." In this case,
Goldman, an orthodox Jew and Air Force officer, contended that he had a free
exercise right to wear a yarmulke while in uniform, notwithstanding an Air
Force regulation mandating uniform dress for Air Force personnel. Even
though the effect of the regulation was to restrict the wearing of the yarmulke
required by Goldman's religious beliefs, the Court, utilizing an extremely
deferential standard, held that the Air Force regulation was a reasonable one."3
83. Id. at 98.
84. 1& at 105.
85. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
86. GEDICKS, supra note 51, at 98; Howard, supra note 57, at 499.
87. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
88. Id. at 257.
89. Id. at 259.
90. Id. at 260; see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985) (purporting to apply strict scrutiny standard the Court refused to exempt a religious
organization from minimum wage taxes); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (purporting to apply strict scrutiny standard the Court refused
to exempt a religious organization from a sales tax).
91. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
92. Id. at 506.
93. Id. at 507, 510.
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Given the military context, nothing more than reasonableness was required.
In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazi' the Court once again used something less
than a strict scrutiny standard in disposing of a free exercise claim. Estate of
Shabazz involved prison inmates and members of the Islamic faith who claimed
that prison policies prevented them from attending Muslim congregational
services on Friday afternoons, thereby interfering with the free exercise of their
religion. 5 While recognizing that the prison policies interfered with the
sincerely held religious beliefs of the Muslim inmates, the Court nonetheless
used an extremely deferential standard in holding that the prison policies were
reasonable ones; given the prison context nothing more than reasonableness was
required.e
In Bowen v. Roy,' the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
compel the government to accommodate a religiously based objection to a
federal statutory requirement that the states use social security numbers in
administering the food stamp program.98 Roy, a Native American, claimed,
among other things, that the state's use of a social security number for his two-
year-old daughter, "Little Bird of the Snow," violated his Native American
religious beliefs." In rejecting Roy's claim the Court stated that the Free
Exercise Clause "cannot be understood to require the [g]overnment to conduct
its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of
particular citizens."'"4 The Court concluded that use of Little Bird of the
Snow's social security number did not by itself interfere with Roy's free exercise
of religion."0 ' A Court plurality believed the rational relationship between the
use of the social security number and the administration of the food stamp
program was sufficient.
Finally, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,"4 the
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the government from
constructing a road or permitting timber harvesting in a national forest that
historically had been used for religious purposes by Native Americans. The
Court forthrightly noted that the road-building and logging projects at issue
"could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices."' The
Court also observed "that the threat to the efficacy of at least some religious
practices was extremely grave."'"4 Yet, said the Court:
94. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
95. Id. at 344-45.
96. Id. at 345, 350.
97. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 700-01.
99. Id. at 695, 697.
100. Id. at 699.
101. Id. at 700.
102. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
103. Id. at 451.
104. Id.
No. 2]
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The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly
owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of
a [s]ocial [s]ecurity number in Roy. In both cases, the challenged
[g]overnment action would interfere significantly with private
persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own
reigious beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected
individuals be coerced by the [g]ovemment's action into violating
their religious beliefs .... "
One conclusion to be drawn from these Supreme Court cases is that the
actual protection afforded the free exercise of religion is not nearly as great as
the post-Smith rhetoric seems to suggest." After reading these post-Yoder
cases it is impossible to agree with one critic's view of Smith that, after Sherbert
and before Smith, the Court required the granting of a religious exemption
unless the government could show that the exemption undermined "an
overriding, substantial, compelling, or important interest that could not be
achieved by some narrower alternative means.""1t0 Such a view mistakes
rhetoric for action. The Court's abandonment of the constitutionally compelled
exemption doctrine in Smith simply made explicit what had been since Yoder
the "functional law of free exercise.""
Moreover, prior to Smith, the federal courts of appeals had unanimously
refused "to create free exercise havens from violation of the national criminal
laws . "' Not only had the courts of appeals rejected all free exercise
challenges to the federal criminal drug statutes,"' but also to federal criminal
statutes generally."' Even if the Smith case had never arisen, Peyote Way's
free exercise claim seemed bound to fail.
105. Id. at 449.
106. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 121.
107. CHOPER, supra note 49, at 54.
108. GEDICKS, supra note 51, at 99.
109. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1986).
110. Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (free
exercise challenge to federal drug statutes rejected); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 511-13
(1st Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 824-26 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (same),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
111. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 954-57 (free exercise challenge to criminal immigration statute
rejected); United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1985) (free exercise challenge
to criminal destruction of property statute rejected); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1226-
27 (2d Cir. 1983) (free exercise challenge to criminal tax statute rejected), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
971 (1984); United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772-74 (3d Cir. 1982) (free exercise
challenge to criminal racketeering statute rejected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983); United
States v. Rasheed, 666 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981) (free exercise challenge to criminal mail
fraud statute rejected), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
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The Federal Exemption for the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native
American Church was a Political Classification and Did Not Violate the
Equal Protection Principle
In its lawsuit Peyote Way claimed the federal exemption"' was a racial not
a political classification, and thus a violation of the equal protection principle;
Peyote Way's claim was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit."3 To understand why the Fifth Circuit properly rejected Peyote
Way's claim one must start at the beginning with the Marshall trilogy of




From the very beginnings of this Nation's history the Supreme Court of the
United States has treated American Indians as a people apart. In Johnson, the
primary issue before the Court was whether Indians could give, and non-Indians
receive, a title to land that the United States courts would uphold."7 The Court
took this occasion to announce the doctrine of discovery, the original foundation
of titles to land on the American continent. This doctrine stated that "discovery
gave title to the government... against all other European governments, which
title might be consummated by possession."". From the exclusion of all other
European nations, there flowed to the discovering nation "the sole right of
acquiring the soil from its natives and establishing settlements upon it.""' 9 The
Court noted that in the establishment of this relationship, the rights of the
original inhabitants had been "necessarily," and "to a considerable extent,
impaired;" but not "entirely disregarded."" The Court continued:
[the original inhabitants] were admitted to be the rightful occupants
of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights
to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
112. The federal exemption provides in pertinent part: "The listing of peyote as a controlled
substance in Schedule I does not apply to the use of peyote in the bona fide ceremonies of the
Native American Church .. " See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990).
113. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214-16 (5th Cir. 1991).
114. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
115. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1830).
116. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
117. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
118. Id. at 573.
119. l.
120. Il at 574.
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fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
who made it.'
In short, the discovering nation asserted "ultimate dominion" in itself, while
recognizing an "Indian right of occupancy."' " This ultimate dominion, noted
Chief Justice Marshall, passed from Great Britain to the United States by the
treaty that concluded the Revolutionary War." This power, to grant land with
valid title, now possessed by the government of the United States, "has never
been questioned in our Courts. It has been exercised uniformly in territory in
possession of the Indians."''
In Cherokee Nation the tribe, claiming it was a foreign nation, sought to
enjoin the State of Georgia from executing laws providing for the seizure of
Cherokee lands."z The primary issue before the Court was whether "the
Cherokee nation [was] a foreign state in the sense in which that term [wa]s used
in the constitution?"'" In answering this question in the negative, the Court
noted that "[tihe condition of the Indians in relation to the United States [wa]s
perhaps unlike that of any two people in existence," a relationship "marked by
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.I'" The Court
acknowledged that the Indians had "an unquestioned right to the lands they
occupy" until "extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government."'" Yet,
said Chief Justice Marshall:
[lit may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their
right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.'9
Simply stated, the Cherokee Nation was a "domestic dependent nation" not a
foreign one, a "nation" constitutionally confined to a paternalistic wardship
under the tutelage of its guardian, the United States.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 584.
124. Id. at 587-88.
125. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
126. Id. at 16.
127. Id.
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In Worcester, the last of the Marshall trilogy, the primary issue before the
Court was whether a Georgia statute prohibiting "white persons" from residing
on Cherokee lands without a state license, and without taking an oath to defend
the Georgia constitution, was a law "repugnant" to the Constitution, treaties, and
laws of the United States.' Worcester was a missionary residing on Cherokee
lands with tribal permission, and under the authority of a federal statute; Georgia
authorities prosecuted and convicted Worcester of violating the state statute, and
he was sentenced to four years imprisonment.'
In striking down the Georgia statute" Chief Justice Marshall made several
observations about Indian sovereignty vis-4-vis the states of the Union:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from any other intercourse
with any other European potentate than the first discoverer ....
The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them means 'a people
distinct from others.' The constitution, by declaring treaties already
made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the
land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those
powers who are capable of making treaties.33
The Chief Justice suggested that Georgia had acquiesced "in the universal
conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they
occupied, until that right should be extinguished by the United States with their
consent . . . .'"' The Chief Justice made explicit the proper relationships
among the United States, the Indian nations, and the States of the Union:
The Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have
no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves,
or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The
whole intercourse between the United States and [the Cherokee]
nation is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States.'"
130. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 541-42.
131. Id. at 536, 538.
132. Id. at 561.
133. Id. at 559.
134. Id. at 560.
135. Id.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
In other words, under our constitutional system, it was the federal government
and the federal government alone that was authorized to deal with these
"domestic dependent nations."'
'
A close reading of the Marshall trilogy demonstrates that while Indian tribes
assert a measure of political sovereignty over persons and property within the
boundaries of their reservations, Indian tribes are "strange sovereigns" in a
constitutional sense."r One reason for this apparent strangeness is our
constitutional system. The Supreme Court's primary struggles have been over
the allocation of power between the federal and state governments, and between
governmental power and individual rights; Indian tribal sovereignty does not fit
comfortably into this matrix." In addition, during the eighteenth century, the
"individual-state dichotomy" became a powerful influence on Western thought,
and this dichotomy leaves little room for "intermediate associational
groupings.""' The dichotomy simply does not lend iiself to assigning such
groupings rights not reducible to either the liberties of the individual or the
prerogatives of the state." Indian tribes or "nations" are an anomaly in the
American constitutional system.
An understanding of the Marshall trilogy is important because in these
opinions Chief Justice Marshall created much of our' federal Indian law,
tradition.' While these opinions certainly suggest that Marshall was more
concerned with centralizing in the federal government power over Indians and
their lands than with the "normative consequences" of colonization, one may
also read the opinions as establishing a more "normatively attractive vision" of
federal Indian law.42 Critics of the Marshall trilogy43 often ignore Marshall's
concern for the plight of the Indians. In Cherokee Nation, for example, Marshall
stated:
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better
calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people once
numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors
in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain,
gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our
arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each of which
contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they retain no
136. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
137. Nell J. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984).
138. Id. at 196.
139. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 13-14 (1996).
140. Id. at 14.
141. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1223 (1990).
142. Id. at 1224.
143. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 137, at 199-205.
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more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary
to their comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant, the
present application [for injunctive relief] is made.1"
Marshall could hardly ignore his role as the Chief Justice of the highest court
of a colonizing nation. 5 Marshall forthrightly acknowledged that the doctrines
of discovery, conquest, and original Indian title were somewhat "extravagant,"
and "opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations," yet, said
Marshall, if these doctrines "be indispensable to that system under which the
country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual conditions of the two
people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected
by Courts of Justice."'"
While Marshall was true to his high position in the colonizing government,
he was not uncritical of the doctrines of discovery, conquest, and Indian land
title; he attempted to accommodate the tribal perspective, especially in Cherokee
Nation and Worcester.'47 In these opinions Marshall attempted to reconcile
"the anomalous existence" of the Indians within the Nation's boundaries,'" a
difficult task given that the three opinions "were substantially framed by the
question of the status of indigenous people within the Vattellian version of
international law"'49 with its emphasis on the individual-state dichotomy.
As a formal matter Marshall assumed that he could not entertain fundamental
challenges to colonization, yet as a functional matter, he allowed his qualms
about colonization to lead him "to create a method of interpretation that
presumed tribal sovereignty to be substantial as a matter of law even if weak as
a matter of fact."'" If the destruction of tribal sovereignty was the aim, then
Marshall would have forced Congress to do it overtly.' Marshall was
adamant in his attempt to keep the states, who were "extraordinarily hostile" to
tribal independence, out of the business of colonization altogether." It is
difficult to see what more could have been expected from Marshall," for his
144. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
145. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1224.
146. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-92.
147. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1225, 1227.
148. ANAYA, supra note 139, at 16.
149. Id.
150. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1228.
151. Id.
152. ld.
153. It is important to remember that Indian policy under the Jackson Administration was
distinguished not only by its refusal to recognize Indian tribes as in any way sovereign, but by
its favoring the removal of all Indians inhabiting lands east of the Mississippi River, and by its
encouraging of the states in their taking of Indian lands. The Cherokee Nation and Worcester
cases showed every sign of precipitating a political crisis, with Justice Story believing that state
resistance to Indian claims and the nullification doctrine being two sides of the same coin. See
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 711, 723 (1991).
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opinions were an attempt to doctrinally curb the most likely excesses of state
intrusions into Indian lands, an attempt to blunt the assault of colonization." 4
The Plenary Power Doctrine
The "mystique of plenary power" has pervaded the federal regulation of
Indian affairs from the beginning.'5  The plenary power doctrine, as
exemplified in Worcester, has become a fixture of American Indian law."
From the beginning of the Nation's history Congress has assumed "nearly
unfettered authority to govern Indian affairs."'" The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, and has
never struck down a federal statute directly regulating any aspect of Indian
affairs on the ground that Congress had exceeded its authority."'
A brief look at several early Supreme Court cases illustrate the sweep of the
aptly named plenary power doctrine. United States v. Rogers" involved a
federal criminal prosecution for murder in Indian county. The federal criminal
statute, which Congress made applicable to Indian country, did not apply to
crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian." The Court held the prosecution of Rogers, a white man who had
been adopted by the Cherokee tribe, was proper in federal court for a murder
committed in Indian country. 6' More important than the holding was Chief
Justice Taney's broad language regarding the discovery doctrine:
The native tribes that were found on this continent at the time of its
discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as independent
nations by the European governments, nor regarded as the owners
of the territories they respectively occupied. On the contrary, the
whole continent was divided and parceled out, and granted by the
governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and unoccupied
land, and the Indians continually held to be, and treated as, subject
to their dominion and control.
[ihe Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the
United States are subject to their authority, and where the country
occupied by them is not within the limits of one of the States,
154. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LAW 46 (1995).
155. Newton, supra note 137, at 199.
156. j'd.
157. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1138.
158. Id. at 1139.
159. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
160. Id. at 572.
161. Id. at 571-72.
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Congress may by law punish any offense committed there, no
matter whether the offender be a white man or an Indian."
In United States v. Kagama6 3 the issue before the Court was the
constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act; this Act made murder, and several
other serious offenses, federal crimes if committed by one Indian against another
Indian in Indian country. In upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes
Act, the Court noted that congressional power to enact laws governing Indian
country originated in "the ownership of the country," and the right of "exclusive
sovereignty," vis-k-vis the Indian tribes, which existed in the national
government and was found nowhere else." In Kagama the national
government claimed ultimate title in the land itself, prohibiting Indian tribes
from selling or transferring land to other nations or principals without its
consent." The Court concluded its opinion with sweeping language:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because
it has never existed anywhere else; because the theatre of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce
its laws on all the tribes.6 6
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock"7 the issue before the Court was whether a
congressional allotment statute, in conflict with a treaty banning allotments
unless consented to by three-fourths of the adult male tribal members, was a
valid exercise of congressional power." In sustaining the federal allotment
statute the Court stated that "[t]he power exists to abrogate the provisions of an
Indian treaty," for when "treaties were entered into between the United States
and a tribe of Indians, it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed
in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be availed of from
considerations of governmental policy .... .""
Kagama and Lone Wolf became the "linchpins" of the plenary power
doctrine, a doctrine subject to few judicial limitations.' After Kagama and
Lone Wolf congressional authority over Indian tribes was so extensive that
162. Id. at 572.
163. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
164. Id. at 380.
165. Id. at 381.
166. Id. at 384-85.
167. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
168. Id. at 560-61.
169. Id. at 566.
170. Newton, supra note 137, at 222.
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Congress had the final say as to who was a tribal member for purposes of
distributing property, annuities, and trust money, including the final say as to
how that money was spent.' Not until the 1970s did the Court suggest some
general constitutional limits on congressional power, and even then only under
a highly deferential standard of review." The Supreme Court has "repudiated"
the doctrine of plenary power only to the extent the doctrine suggests it is
"unlimited."'' Despite this theoretical narrowing of the plenary power doctrine
it remains a potent force." Congress continues to act with what is properly
called "breathtaking authority."'7  The Supreme Court has defined
congressional power over Indians in the broadest possible terms, and thus the
application of a deferential standard of review to Indian legislation permits
"almost any conceivable legislative action.''1
7
From Plenary Power to Minimal Scrutiny: Mancari and Its Progeny
In Morton v. Mancari"T the Court upheld a congressionally mandated
employment preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 7' In
rejecting the equal protection challenge to the preference, the Court emphasized
that the preference "[wa]s not directed towards a 'social' group consisting of
Indians'; instead, it applie[d] only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes.
This operate[d] to exclude many individuals who [we]re socially classified as
'Indians.' In this sense, the preference [wa]s political rather than racial in
nature."' 9 Eligibility for the preference required the individual to have "one-
fourth or more degree Indian blood," and claim membership in a federally
recognized Indian tribe." ° The Court again emphasized that the preference was
granted to Indians "not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities [we]re governed by the
171. ld. at 224.
172. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1139; see Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (stating that congressional power over Indian affairs may be of a plenary
nature, but it is not absolute; the political question doctrine does not deter this Court from
scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine whether it violates the equal protection principle);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) (stating that congressional legislation that
singles out Indians for special treatment will be upheld if the special treatment "can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians").
173. Newton, supra note 137, at 228.
174. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (holding that
congressional power to reduce the boundaries of a reservation without tribal consent or
compensation will be upheld based upon the authority of Lone Woof).
175. Newton, supra note 137, at 237.
176. Id. at 242.
177. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
178. Id. at 551-57.
179. Id. at 553 n.24.
180. Id. at 554.
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[Bureau of Indian Affairs] in a unique fashion..'.' Noting that it had
previously upheld legislation that singled out Indians for special treatment, the
Court articulated a minimal scrutiny test:
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the
preference is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian
self-government, we cannot say that Congress' classification violates
[the equal protection principle]."
Two years later the Court decided Fisher v. District Court." In Fisher a
Cheyenne tribal member was denied custody of her child in tribal court; another
tribal member was awarded temporary custody, with the child being made a
ward of the tribal court; the tribal member who was awarded temporary custody
by the tribal court sought permanent custody in state court." The Court held
that the state court lacked jurisdiction over an Indian adoption proceeding; the
denial of access to the state court did not violate the equal protection principle,
noted the Court, because the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court derived not
from the race of the tribal member seeking access to the state court, but from
the quasi-sovereign status of the tribe under federal law." Citing Mancari the
Court concluded that "such disparate treatment of the Indian [wa]s justified
because it [wa]s intended to benefit the class of which he [wa]s a member by
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government."'
One year later the Court decided United States v. Antelope." Antelope
involved two tribal Indians who had been convicted in federal court of the
felony-murder of a non-Indian on the reservation." The defendants contended
that their felony-murder convictions were racially discriminatory because a non-
Indian charged with the same crime would have been subject to state law, which
required proof of premeditation in a prosecution for first degree murder;
premeditation was not required under the federal enclave murder statute 9
In rejecting the racial discrimination argument, the Court cited Mancari and
noted that federal legislation "expressly singling out Indian tribes" was supported
by the federal government's special relationship with the Indians." ° The Court
noted that Mancari and Fisher involved preferences or disabilities directly
181. Id
182. Id at 555.
183. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
184. Id. at 383.
185. Id at 390.
186. Id at 391.
187. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
188. Id at 642-43.
189. Id. at 643-44.
190. Id. at 645.
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promoting Indian interests in self-government; unlike those cases, the instant
case dealt: not with tribal self-government but "with federal regulation of
criminal conduct within Indian country implicating Indian interests.'.9 The
distinction mattered not, said the Court, for "the principles reaffirmed in
Mancari and Fisher point[ed] more broadly to the conclusion that federal
regulation of Indian affairs [wa]s not based upon impermissible
classifications."'" Put more succinctly, all federal legislation affecting Indian
tribes is "governance."'" After Antelope "it [wa]s difficult to conceive of a
federal statute regarding Indian tribes ... that could be found to violate the
requirements of equal protection."'" While the "plenary power doctrine may
have faded as the explicit analytical theory for justifying the exercise of
congressional power ... its doctrinal emanations [we]re still present. Whatever
Congress want[ed], Congress g[ot], and Mancari and its progeny [we]re now
increasingly impressed to serve that end."'"5
The Federal Exemption and the Minimal Scrutiny Test of Mancari
As previously noted, the federal exemption" allows members of the Native
American Church to use the controlled substance peyote in its bona fide
religious ceremonies. The intertribal Native American Church is the latest
manifestation of a centuries-old Native American peyotist religion; the Native
American Church has approximately 250,000 Native American members, most
of whom live on reservations west of the Mississippi River.'" The members
of the Native American Church are organized into chapters, with each chapter
representing a tribe.'98 To qualify for membership, the bylaws of the Native
American Church require that the member possess one-quarter Indian blood, and
that he or she claim membership in a tribe.'" When traveling to Texas to
obtain peyote, Native American Church members carry a "certificate of
authorization"; this certificate contains, among other things, a tribal enrollment
number.c In addition, the Church's articles of incorporation provide for the
conducting of its religious rituals in Indian country."'
In its lawsuit Peyote Way contended the federal exemption was a racial
classification because it did not contain the words "tribal" or "reservation," and
191. Id. at 646.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Newton, supra note 137, at 279.
194. Id. at 280.
195. Id. at 285.
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990).
197. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991).
198. Federal Appellee's Brief at 3, Peyote Way Church of God, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1991) (No. 88-7039).
199. Id.
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because it classified people only by their membership in the Native American
Church.2  Peyote Way's contention ignored the intertribal nature of the Native
American Church, a pan-tribal church that required its members to have at least
one-quarter Indian blood, and that they claim membership in a federally
recognized tribe.'
In its essentials, the federal exemption is little different than the preference
upheld in Mancari; the federal exemption, like the preference upheld in
Mancari, requires at least a twenty-five percent blood quantum and membership
in a federally recognized tribe. Moreover, the federal exemption is not unlike
the various preferences for tribal Indians scattered throughout title 25 of the
United States Code. Indeed, as the Court noted in Mancari:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations.. . single out for special treatment a constituency of
tribal Indians living on or near Indian reservations. If these laws
derived from historical relationships, and explicitly designed to help
only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire
title of the United States Code ... would be effectively erased and
the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indian
would be jeopardized.V'
Given the "breathtaking authority"' of Congress over Indian affairs, the
federal exemption is easily justified as special treatment "tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians .... ." The federal
exemption clearly meets the minimal scrutiny test of Mancari because the
exemption merely recognizes the traditional and centuries-long history of peyote
use in the religious ceremonies of tribal Indians.
The federal exemption shows a certain sensitivity to Native American
religion and culture, not unlike the sensitivity shown by the Court in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, a case involving the equal protection clause of the
Indian Civil Rights Act.' Martinez, a tribal member, contended that the
tribe's membership rules discriminated on the basis of sex; it did so, argued
Martinez, by denying membership to the children of female tribal members
marrying outside the tribe, while extending membership to children of similarly
situated males.' In rejecting this equal protection argument the Court held
that the Indian civil rights statute prescribed a rule of decision for tribal courts;
202. Peyote Way Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1215.
203. Id.
204. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
205. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1140.
206. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
207. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
208. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (8) (1990) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
209. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52-53.
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an individual could not maintain a lawsuit against the tribe, said the Court,
because the civil rights statute contained no explicit waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity ° Despite its narrow construction of the statute, the Court, citing
Lone Wolf, emphasized the expansive authority of Congress over Indian
affairs" This narrow construction of the Indian civil rights statute was
necessary, said the Court, because attempts to apply the equal protection
principle in the Indian context might "substantially interfere with a tribe's ability
to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity.
22
The Court interpreted the Indian civil rights statute as it did to protect
"traditional values of patriarchy still significant in tribal life." ' The Court
stressed that Congress, in enacting the Indian civil rights statute, chose not to
extend every provision of the Bill of Rights to tribal Indians so as to protect the
"unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments." M The
Court left no doubt, however, that if Congress wanted to authorize such civil
actions it was perfectly free to do so, so long as it did so explicitly: "[U]nless
and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion
on tribal sovereignty that adjudication in a federal forum would represent, we
are constrained to find that [the Indian Civil Rights statute] does not impliedly
authorize [civil actions] against either the tribe or its officers.""2 '
In Martinez the Court showed an "extraordinary sensitivity 2 6 to the
traditional tribal value of patriarchy; Congress, in authorizing the federal
exemption, showed an "extraordinary sensitivity" to peyotism, a traditional
Native American religion. In these circumstances the United States Court of
Appeals properly concluded that the federal exemption did not violate the equal
protection principle 7
The Federal Exemption for the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native
American Church Was Not an Establishment of Religion, Not Only Because
It Was an Aspect of the Special Relationship Between the Federal
Government and the Indian Tribes, but Also Because the Regulation Pertains
to an Indian Religious Practice Deeply Embedded in the Nation's History
In its lawsuit Peyote Way claimed the federal exemption was an
establishment of religion; in rejecting Peyote Way's claim, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the unique relationship between
the federal government and Native American tribes "precludes the degree of
210. ld. at 59.
211. Id. at72.
212. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 54.
214. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 72.
216. Newton, supra note 137, at 265.
217. Feyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991).
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separation of church and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment. Tie
federal government cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as a protector of
tribal Native Americans, and apply conventional separatist understandings of the
establishment clause to that same relationship." '
As previously noted, the federal exemption was "tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians,""2 9 and for this reason
alone the Court could not categorize it as an establishment of religion. Aside
from this rationale, however, another perhaps exists. One can justify the federal
exemption by using not a doctrinal approach but an historical one, an approach
perfectly consistent with the actions of six Presidents of the United States -
Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, Adams, Jackson, and Van Buren -
who entered into treaties with various Indian tribes authorizing the use of federal
funds for religious purposes.'
On Deism, Religious Centrism, and Evangelicalism: The Religious Views of
the Founders
The Founders held a variety of religious views; America's tradition of
religious liberty was not exclusively the work of Madison and Jefferson
Three major groups contributed to the historical meaning of the Establishment
Clause: Enlightenment Separationists, Political Centrists, and Pietistic
Separatists.'m
The Enlightenment Separationists, as the name implies, were deeply
influenced by the Enlightenment; Paine, Jefferson, and Madison were part of
this tradition. While the Court has generally emphasized the Enlightenment
tradition of separation, this tradition was not the predominant one.m Indeed,
the Enlightenment tradition of separation as exemplified by Paine, Jefferson, and
Madison was a radical one. The anticlerical views of the "Founding Deists"
focused on insulating government from religious dominationtm Having
achieved a complete victory in Virginia, a "severe separation" of church and
state, these deists would have liked nothing better than for the rest of the Nation
to follow Virginia's example. These men of the Enlightenment viewed
218. Id at 1217.
219. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
220. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 51; not only did President Jefferson sign an
Indian treaty that provided federal monies to serve the religious needs of a tribe, but he approved
legislation underwriting missionary expenses to spread the Gospel among the Indians. LEONARD
W. LEVY, THE ESTABLsMIENT CLAUSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 248 (2d ed. rev. 1994).
221. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
153 (paperback ed. 1988).
222. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 22, 31.
223, Id. at 22.
224. Id at 26.
225. Id at 31.
226. MILLER, supra note 221, at 234.
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revealed religion as a major impediment to the truths on which the Nation
rested; indeed Paine publicly, and Jefferson and Madison privately, viewed
evangelical Christianity as a "particularly murky section of the swamp of
unreason.
'"D
The spread of Enlightenment philosophy and natural religion reached its
apogee during the Revolutionary period and began to decline by 1800. It
was during this period that deism, or rational religion, enjoyed popularity and
prestige .just as it had in France; deism was the "cult of reason," the "republican
religion," and Jefferson was its "St. Paul."'
Jefferson was aware that Americans would not accept his theology of
religious freedom and separation of church and state unless persuaded that
traditional Christian doctrine was false; in this endeavor Jefferson found his ally
in Paine.' Jefferson believed that when the falsity of Christian doctrine was
shown aid its falsity accepted by the mass of mankind, it would then be
possible for mankind to firmly attach itself to the "God of the Declaration of
Independence," that is, to "Nature's God."'" When the Nation accepted the
Jeffersonian theology, the "religious problem" would achieve a resolution and
free government be secured.m
Many of the Founders had more moderate views. These political and
religious centrists were as committed to liberty of conscience as the
Enlightenment separationists, but they viewed organized religion as a positive
and necessary social cohesive. 3 George Washington, John Adams, John
Marshall, Oliver Ellsworth, and the Carrolls of Maryland, for example, believed
organized religion was an essential cornerstone of morality, civic virtue, and
democratic government.' These political and religious centrists approached
the issues of church and state pragmatically, and were less concerned than the
Enlightenment Separationists with the specific means of attaining religious
liberty; they regarded organized religion as an essential source of personal and
227. Id. at 236.
228. SIDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 364 (1972).
229. Id. at 366-67.
230. There is nothing in Paine's notorious The Age of Reason that does not find a place in
the thoughts Jefferson committed to paper; Jefferson generally concealed his radical religious
views from the public, unlike the rabidly anticlerical Paine who openly attacked Christianity.
WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 24-25
(paperback ed. 1988); see THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON (1794), reprinted in PAINE:
COLLECTIED WRrMNGS 665 (Eric Foner ed., 1995); see also SMITH, supra note 52, at 20 (finding
that skeptics have long suspected that Jefferson's secret intent in promoting religious freedom was
to underinine traditional Christianity).
231. BERNS, supra note 230, at 24.
232. AHLSTROM, supra note 228, at 368; BERNS, supra note 230, at 24.
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social morality, and, when in office, repeatedly recognized the importance of
organized religion in the Nation's public life. 5
This centrist position was the predominant one; the centrist position
recognized that adoption of the separation principle did not require a secular
society, for one could view separation in institutional terms only 6 It did not
occur to these political and religious centrists to view society and religion as
separate, and if the thought had occurred to them, it would have met with
"uniform disapproval." The centrist view recognized the connection between
religion and morality, and intuitively understood that religion was an essential
pillar of civil society; the same Congress that drafted the Religion Clauses
requested President Washington to proclaim a day of public thanksgiving, and
approved congressional and military chaplains.0' These political and religious
centrists affirmed the importance of religion to the new Republic, demonstrating,
by their words and deeds, that the separation of church and state did not mean
the separation of religion and politics. 9
Pietistic separationists also believed that the separation of church and state
did not mean the separation of religion and politics; pietistic separationists
worked to separate church and state only in an "institutional sense."' The
pietistic tradition looked to the thought of Roger Williams and William Penn in
aggressively defending religious liberty, a principle they viewed as vital to the
purity of the organized church.24 This tradition emphasized the corrupting
effect of government interference'
The most important of the eighteenth century pietistic separationists was
the Baptist leader, Isaac Backus, who worked to disestablish Congregational-
ism in New England; Backus attacked the Congregationalist establishment,
believing it was corrupt because of its direct link to the state. 3 While
Backus was a sometime ally of Jefferson, he certainly did not desire the
secular state envisioned by JeffersonY 4 The reasons Backus and the pietistic
separationists had for supporting the separation of church and state were
markedly different from those of Jefferson, Paine, and the Enlightenment
separationists.0' Jefferson and company believed separation would lead to
the casting off of superstitions and shackles on the mind, and would free men
for Enlightenment ideas; Backus and company believed separation was
235. Id. at 31.
236. ld. at 51.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 51-52.
240. Id. at 31.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. MILLER, supra note 221, at 211, 214; ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 29.
244. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 30.
245. MILLER, supra note 221, at 214.
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necessary so that men would be free to accept the "freely given grace of
God.",'4
Backus found in Roger Williams an expounder of a theological or
evangelical reason for separation. The most widely held early American idea
of the separation of church and state flowed from religious pietism, not from
Enlightenment rationalism.2 s While Backus was a fierce opponent of state
establishments, he was not opposed to Sabbath laws, or to the teaching of
Calvinistic doctrine in the public schools, or to the proscribing of blasphemy,
or to the promulgation of official days of fasting and prayer.' 9 The pietistic
separatism of Backus was a world apart from the anticlerical deism of
Jefferson." °
Enlightenment separationists, political and religious centrists, and pietistic
separationists, all contributed to the historical meaning of the Religion Clauses,
and thus the views of each are relevant to constitutional interpretation; any
attempt to reduce the Founders' views to one position, or to read the beliefs of
selected Founders into the First Amendment, is "indefensible.""UI
Everson's Misuse of History: The Tainted Source of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence
In Everson v. Board of Education' the Supreme Court held that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included the
nonestablishment principle an Invoking Jefferson's wall of separation metaphor
the Court announced its expansive and historical reading of the Establishment
Clause, setting forth "a thoroughly Jeffersonian and Madisonian position."'
The Court's "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause turned the clause on its
head, transferring it into a vehicle for federal interference with state religious
matters.z5 In Everson, the first modem Establishment Clause case, the Court
turned in a "dismal historical performance,"' a performance that "dishonored
the arts of the historian."''
246. Id.
247. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 29; MILLER, supra note 221, at 215.
248. MILLER, supra note 221, at 215.
249. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 30.
250. Id at 22.
251. Id. at 31; SMITH, supra note 52, at 11-12 (finding that there are many versions of
religious liberty that are both "attractive and defensible").
252. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
253. Id. at 18.
254. MILLER, supra note 221, at 131.
255. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 34; SMrrH, supra note 52, at 17-21 (stating that
the Religion Clauses were purely jurisdictional in nature, and did not adopt any substantive
principle of religious freedom; those who drafted, proposed, and ratified the Religion Clauses
understood them to be an exercise in federalism; the clauses were simply an assignment of
jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states).
256. SMIrH, supra note 52, at 5.
257. MARK DE WOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
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The Court's interpretation of history in Everson was "superficial and
purposive,"''1 its historical inquiry focusing almost exclusively on the Virginia
disestablishment, thereby simplifying that which was complex.' Displaying
a remarkable unconcern for historical truth and methodology, the Court read
Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom and equated it with the Establishment
Clause; the Court took no note of the obvious objections to equating the two,
and took no notice that the statute and the clause were two very different texts,
adopted by very different bodies, for very different purposes.' By ignoring
the views of the political and religious centrists and the pietistic separationists,
the Court flattened and distorted a complex history. When Jefferson's
metaphor of the "wall of separation between church and state" appeared in
Everson, the metaphor came clothed in Jeffersonian garb sparkling "with the
anticlerical presuppositions of the Enlightenment."' To the extent the
Establishment Clause codifies a figure of speech, the clause embraces the
"believing affirmations" of Roger Williams and Isaac Backus, no less than the
questioning doubts of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Since the
Court ignored this elementary truth, Establishment Clause jurisprudence was
tainted at the source. Everson gave rise to opinions like Lemon v. Kurtzmanan
premised on "an historical separation of church and state."'' In Everson the
Court laid down historically biased principles for interpreting the Establishment
Clause, principles it has never abandoned, often using the three-pronged test of
Lemon to enforce its Everson interpretation.' On rare occasions, however, the
Court ignores its historical Everson approach and concerns itself with historical
practice.
The Federal Exemption and the Historical Approach of Walz and Chambers
As previously noted, peyotism is a religious practice that is centuries-old; as
also noted, the federal relationship between the tribal Indians and the federal
government is centuries old. The Supreme Court has on occasion used an
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 4 (1965).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 3.
260. SMITH, supra note 52, at 46.
261. MILLER, supra note 221, at 311.
262. HOWE, supra note 257, at 1-2.
263. Id. at 9.
264. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
265. ADAMs & EMMERICH, supra note 63, at 56.
266. LEVY, supra note 220, at 150, 157; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)
(holding that in reliance on Lemon, including a clergyman who offered a prayer as part of a
public school graduation ceremony, constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause). As the
dissent stated, however, the majority opinion "lays waste to a tradition that is as old as public
school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even more longstanding
American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally." Id. at 632
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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approach that takes into consideration an "historical frame of reference"; it is to
this approach that we now turn.
In Walz v. Tax Commission' the Court held that a legislative tax
exemption for property used exclusively for religious purposes did not violate
the Establishment Clause. In upholding the property tax exemption, the Court
took note of the historical practice of providing churches with such exemptions,
stating that "two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation ha[d] [not]
given the remotist sign of leading to an established church or religion .... ,
"If tax exemption can be seen as the first step toward 'establishment' of
religion," said the Court, "the second step has been long in coming."2
Quoting Justice Cardozo the Court noted the "tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic," and stated that "such expansion must always be
contained by the historical frame of reference of the principle's
purpos ....
In Lemon v. Kurzman' the Supreme Court held that a state statute
providing for a salary supplement for teachers in religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause; the teachers were to teach only those courses offered in
the public schools, and to use only those materials used in the public
schools.' In striking down the state statute, the Court announced its three-
prong -test for determining an establishment of religion; to avoid constitutional
infirmity, the government would have to show that the program in question had
a secular purpose, that its principal or primary aim neither advanced nor
inhibited religion, and that it did not foster an entanglement of religion.'
Distinguishing Walz the Court stated:
In Walz it was argued that a tax exemption for places of
religious worship would prove to be the first step in an inevitable
progression leading to the establishment of state churches and state
religion. That claim could not stand up against more than 200
years of virtually universal practice embedded in our colonial
experience and continuing into the present.
The progression argument, however, is more persuasive here [in
jIon]. We have no long history of state aid to church-related
educational institutions comparable to 200 years of tax exemption
for churches. Indeed, the state programs before us today represent
something of an innovation 4
267. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
268. Id. at 676-78.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 678-79 (emphasis added).
271. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
272. Id. at 619-20.
273. Id. at 612-13.
274. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
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In Lemon the Court distinguished between a "virtually universal practice" and
"innovation," devising a three-part test for determining the validity of a non-
historical and innovative program.
More than a decade after Lemon, the Supreme Court decided Larson v.
Valente,275 striking down a state statute that exempted from reporting
requirements those churches that received more than one-half of their total
contributions from their memberships. The Court noted that the Lemon test
applied to all statutes that afforded, "a uniform benefit to all religions," and not
to statutes, like the one before it, that "discriminate[d] among religions."'276
When faced with a statute granting a "denominational preference," said the
Court, it would view the statute as "suspect," and apply "strict scrutiny" to it.2'
The Court would invalidate such a statute unless justified by a "compelling
governmental interest," and "closely fitted to further that interest .... ,278
One year after Valente the Court decided Marsh v. Chambers,2" holding
that the Nebraska legislature's chaplaincy practice did not violate the
Establishment Clause. In upholding the practice - a practice that included the
Nebraska legislature beginning each of its sessions with a prayer offered by a
Presbyterian minister who had been on the public payroll for sixteen years -
the Court stated that "the opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country."'  Quoting from Walz, the Court emphasized the
"weight to be accorded history," noting that an "unbroken practice... [wa]s not
something to be lightly cast aside.'' Relying on the historical practice
approach of Walz, the Chambers majority made no mention of Lemon or
Valente. The dissent, however, did.
The dissent asserted that the Nebraska chaplaincy practice was inconsistent
not only with Lemon, but also with Valente:
The Lemon tests do not, of course, exhaust the set of formal
doctrines that can be brought to bear on [establishment clause
issues]. Last term . . . we made clear that a state program that
discriminated among religious faiths . . . 'must be invalidated unless
it is justified by compelling governmental interest, and unless it is
closely fitted to further that interest.' In this case, the appointment
of a single chaplain for 16 years, and the evident impossibility of
a Buddhist monk or Sioux Indian religious worker being appointed
for a similar period . . . might well justify application of the
275. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
276. Id. at 252.
277. /d. at 246.
278. Id. at 247.
279. 463 U.S. 784 (1983).
280. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
281. Id. at 790 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 678).
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[Valente] test . ... I have little doubt that the [Nebraska
chaplaincy] practice... would fail the [Valente] test.m
As the dissent aptly noted, the Lemon and Valente tests were easily applicable
to the facts presented in Chambers. The Chambers majority, however, ignored
the Lemon and Valente tests because the Nebraska chaplaincy practice
represented a two-hundred-year-old historical practice, an historical practice as
old as the Nation.
Indian peyotism is a centuries-old religious practice, and, as such, fits
comforlably into the unstructured historical approach of Chambers and Walz.
Also, the expansive power of the federal government over the Indian tribes is
centuries-old, and this too fits comfortably into this unstructured historical
approach. Given this history, it is difficult to see the relevance of either Lemon
or Valente to a federal exemption allowing members of the intertribal Native
American Church to use peyote in their traditional religious ceremonies. These
Indian religious practices predated not only the adoption of the Constitution, but
also the first English settlements in America. Applying the Lemon or Valente
tests to a factual setting awash in history, a factual setting rich in historical
nuance, makes little sense. Given Chambers and Walz, there is no need to apply
the Lemon or Valente tests to such an historical setting. Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is sufficiently elastic?' to allow the Chambers and Walz
approach, an approach that brings no dishonor to the arts of the historian.'
Conclusion
Given the opinions of the Supreme Court in the free exercise and "Indian
equal protection" areas, the court of appeals was on solid ground in rejecting
Peyote Way's free exercise and equal protection claims. Given the disarray of
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause opinions,' the court of appeals was
arguably on less solid ground in rejecting Peyote Way's Establishment Clause
claim." Nevertheless, the court of appeals properly rejected Peyote Way's
Establishment Clause claim.
When deciding issues that touch upon Indian affairs judges and legislators
should take into consideration the tribal context, and should avoid undermining
282. d at 800-01, 801 n.11 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
283. Sh~rrm, supra note 52, at 3.
284. HOWE, supra note 257, at 4.
285. GEDICKS, supra note 51, at 2 (stating that documenting the inconsistences of the Court's
Establishment Clause opinions is "a natural cliche in constitutional scholarship"); SMITH, supra
note 52, at 45 (stating that Establishment Clause scholarship "a spectacle of frustration"); MILLER,
supra note 221, at 316 (stating that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues to
sit "partly undigested on the Nation's stomach").
286. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216-20 (5th Cir. 1991)
(one member of the three judge panel dissented finding the federal exemption to be a violation
of the Establishment Clause).
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that context when it conflicts with other values.' Regardless of historical
circumstances, Indians are committed to remaining "indelibly Indian," to
remaining "a people apart," and to resisting incorporation into the dominant
society.' It is important to understand this "indigenous vision," this
"reservation perspective," before deciding issues touching upon Indian
affairs.' Reservations are "islands of Indianness" within an ever-encroaching
society, a place that continues to hold for American Indians the promise of a
"measured separatism."' The cultural, spiritual, and physical context is
important in understanding why Indians are committed to Indian life, and why
non-Indians should respect that commitment."' The federal exemption for the
religious use of peyote by the Native American Church respects this
commitment.
287. Frickey, supra note 141, at 1220.
288. IML
289. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 154, at 2-3.
290. Id. at 18.
291. Id. at 8.
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